I. Introduction
The question of how fundamental information is incorporated into asset prices is one of the most important topics in financial economics. This question is frequently addressed by the large literature on earnings response coefficients in financial accounting 1 , by a broad range of event studies in corporate finance 2 , and by the literature on price discovery and market efficiency 3 . However, empirical research on price discovery is hindered by two major difficulties. First, information is hard to observe. In particular, researchers are confronted with the problem of recording the information flow accurately and of identifying and extracting relevant information driving prices. 4 A second, and even more difficult issue, is to quantify how information is assessed by market participants. Naturally, the valuation of news depends on market participants' prior expectations and on how these expectations are built up based on the corresponding information sets.
Recent research has achieved considerable progress regarding the first problem. Using financial intraday data and headline information conveyed by scheduled macroeconomic releases, several studies were able to identify unanticipated information and to quantify the 1 For example, Collins and Kothari (1989) document that the strength of stock price responses to earnings surprises exhibits cross-sectional as well as temporal variation. Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) relate stock price responses to the sign of unexpected earnings and the overall market level. Sloan (1996), Feltham and Pae (2000) , Douthett, Duchac, Haw, and Lim (2003) , among others, analyze whether differences in price responses are related to differences in the quality of reported earnings.
2 See e.g. Malatesta and Thompson (1985) who investigate market reactions to partially anticipated acquisition announcements, Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992) who study announcements of bond rating agencies, and Nayak and Prabhala (2001) who analyze stock splits.
3 See Fleming and Remolona (1999a) , Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) , and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , among others. 4 Separating expected from unexpected information can be difficult. See e.g. Malatesta and Thompson (1985) who analyze partially anticipated events in the context of acquisition programs and Griffin and Zmijewski (1987) who evaluate different proxies for unexpected earnings.
implied price reaction. 5 The current understanding is that unanticipated information has a strong and clearly identifiable effect on returns and price volatility.
Nevertheless, only little is known about how market participants react to information and how they build their beliefs regarding the meaning and the importance of surprising news.
In this context, recent literature focusses on two major aspects. One branch emphasizes the importance of the state of the market in which the information arrives. For example, Veronesi (1999) shows within a rational expectations equilibrium framework that market participants may react quite differently to the same information -depending on their beliefs whether the economy is in a state of low or high growth. Empirical evidence of such effects is provided by Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) who document that stock price reactions to earnings surprises depend on the overall market level. An alternative branch of the literature focusses on quality of information. The literature on earnings response coefficients and also on detection of opportunistic earnings management measures the quality of information by proxies for the credibility of the reported figures. 6 However, the concept of Bayesian learning suggests measuring the quality of information by its relative precision. 7 This approach is based on the notion that agents' reactions in the market are strongly driven by their prior beliefs and the way they use new information in order to update these beliefs. In these models, the precision of new information (relative to the precision of information available before an announcement) is of particular importance. Therefore one main implication of this literature is that 5 See e.g. Ederington and Lee (1993) , Fleming and Remolona (1999a) , Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) , Hautsch and Hess (2002) or Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) among others. 6 Douthett, Duchac, Haw, and Lim (2003) , for example, document a significantly higher earnings-return association for foreign companies listing on U.S. exchanges who opt for reporting financial information under more strict rules. Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) find that earnings management impairs the value relevance of accounting information. Ronen, Ronen, and Yaari (2003) find that for firms which try to inflate earnings the response to (more credible) negative earnings surprises is stronger than to (less credible) positive surprises.
price reactions are driven not only by the amount of unexpected information but also by its quality. In periods when released data is perceived to be more precise -relative to prior information -a stronger price reaction should be observed to a given piece of unexpected information.
Until now only a few attempts have been undertaken to test for this implication of Bayesian learning, mainly due to problems of measuring information precision. Nevertheless, an important contribution in this field is provided by Krueger and Fortson (2003) who study the influence of U.S. employment news on the daily prices of Treasury bonds, but find only limited evidence for a precision effect. One reason for this result could be that, on a daily aggregation level, the measurement of price responses is overlaid by a lot of noise which complicates the identification of such effects. Another reason could be that the authors' approximation of information quality by a linear time trend which is assumed to capture the increasing precision of announcements over time is presumably too inexact.
To our knowledge, no study has yet examined the claim of Bayesian updating using macroeconomic announcements and high-frequency market data. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap and to test for the empirical relevance of the role of information precision on an intraday basis. By estimating the price response which is caused by the precision of information, we focus on the following two major research issues:
The first objective concerns the question of whether prices actually respond stronger to more precise news. In particular, is the price reaction stronger if the announced information is perceived to be more precise relative to the precision of the information available before the announcement? An answer to this question provides hints on whether market participants' valuations and perceptions of new information are in line with Bayesian learning mechanisms and whether the consideration of such effects significantly contributes to price discovery.
A second question in this paper is related to sign effects, i.e. asymmetries in the price response due to 'good' vs. 'bad' news, since a wide range of papers finds evidence that prices respond stronger to 'bad' news than to 'good' news. 8 In order to preclude that asymmetries in the relative precision of information are driven by spurious correlations between the sign of the news and its precision, we analyze both sign and precision effects. In particular, we test whether prices react stronger to more precise news than to less precise news when the sign of the news is explicitly taken into account. Such an analysis provides insights into the question whether information precision can be a further source for asymmetric price reactions.
One obvious reason for the missing empirical evidence in this area is the lack of precision data, in particular the absence of precision measures for released information. Testing for the influence of information quality necessitates data on both the precision of information available prior to a public announcement and the precision of released information. However, both types of precision measures are rarely available at the same time. If analysts' forecasts are available, as for the headline figures of macroeconomic announcements, a proxy for the (im)precision of prior information can be obtained from the dispersion of analysts' forecasts. 9
Nevertheless, information on the precision of the released data is virtually unavailable, particularly if the accuracy of announcements varies over time. The lack of precision data is not only a problem researchers have to deal with. Also, it often seems to be impossible for market participants as well to infer the precision of a given piece of information at the time of its release. 10 Due to a lack of directly observable release-specific precision measures, market par-8 For example, Fama and French (1993, 1996) explain this phenomenon by differences in the risk premium. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) refer to aspects of investor psychology arising from arguments of behavioral finance. In contrast, Veronesi (1999) attributes these effects to the investor's uncertainty about the state of the economy.
9 See, for example, Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) who use the cross-sectional standard deviation of analysts' forecasts to approximate investors' uncertainty.
10 In some cases, researchers try to extract the perceived precision of the data from its impact on posterior ticipants might try to use supplementary information to infer the accuracy of the announced data.
In order to extract and quantify such precision measures, our empirical analysis focusses on announcements of the U.S. employment report. Besides the fact that this report has a profound and well-documented impact on financial markets 11 , it offers a very interesting second source of information which becomes available at the same time as the widely awaited headline figures: the revision of the previous month's nonfarm payrolls figure. Since revisions reveal measurement errors in the previous reporting period, they may help traders to assess the reliability of the currently released headline figures, in particular if these measurement errors contain predictable components. Therefore we propose to extract a release-specific precision statistic by inspecting the history of (absolute) revisions. Technically speaking, the one-step-ahead forecast from a volatility model fitted to the time series of revisions is used to approximate the (im)precision of the released information. This precision proxy allows us, in connection with the dispersion of analysts' forecasts, to construct a measure of the relative precision of announced and prior information.
Based on high-frequency data of the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) T-bond futures covering a twelve year period from 1991 to 2002, we estimate the T-bond futures reactions in a 90-minute window around the monthly employment releases. This analysis yields the following results: first of all, we document a significant asymmetry in the price response to precise vs. imprecise information, providing strong evidence in favor of the catalyzing effect of information precision. Second, in line with the empirical results of Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) for stocks, we find that the T-bond futures market reacts stronger to 'bad' beliefs. For example, Kandel and Zilberfarb (1999) compare inflation forecasts for a given period before and after a public announcement.
11 Evidence for its extreme market impact is provided, for example, by Ederington and Lee (1993), Fleming and Remolona (1999c) or Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000) . Therefore the U.S. employment report is often referred to as the 'king of announcements' (see, e.g. Li and Engle (1998) or Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) ). news than to 'good' news. Disentangling these two asymmetric price reactions, we show that the catalyzing effect of information precision is not driven by a possibly asymmetric price response to 'good' and 'bad' news. In particular, we find that prices respond significantly stronger to precise 'bad' news than to imprecise 'bad' news. The same holds true for precise and imprecise 'good' news.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section delineates the role of information precision in determining the strength of the price impact. Section III illustrates the main information components of the employment report and explains how to construct appropriate precision estimates. Section IV describes the high-frequency return data, outlines the estimation procedure, and presents the empirical results. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. The role of information precision
Theoretical literature on information processing in financial markets models traders' reactions to news typically in a Bayesian updating framework. 12 In this literature two fundamental results are evident: firstly, the price reaction is driven primarily by the amount of unanticipated information, and secondly, the (relative) quality of information acts as a catalyst and determines the strength of this price reaction. Below we present a simple model framework that allows us to pinpoint the basic mechanisms of Bayesian learning.
Suppose that traders have homogeneous beliefs regarding some economic variable X (e.g. the unemployment rate) before some public announcement is made. 13 Let g(X) denote these prior beliefs about X and assume that they are normally distributed, i.e. g(X) = 12 See e.g. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) , Kim and Verrecchia (1991) , Blume, Easley, and O'Hara (1994) , Kandel and Pearson (1995) , and Veronesi (2000) , to cite only a few.
13 Note that X, like the corresponding forecasts and announcements, relates to one specific reporting month t, and hence should be indexed by t. For ease of exposition, we suppress this index here.
, where µ F represents traders' mean forecast and ρ F is the precision of this forecast defined as the inverse of the variance. Moreover, suppose that a public announcement is released which provides traders with a noisy estimate µ A of X, but does not reveal the realization X itself. We assume an additive error term structure, i.e. µ A = X + ε, where ε is a zero mean normally distributed error term with variance Var[ε] = 1 /ρ A and E[X · ε] = 0.
Hence the conditional probability density function of
Note that we abstract from information asymmetries and assume that all market participants know µ F and ρ F before the announcement and that the public announcement reveals both
Let g(X|µ A ) denote traders' posterior beliefs after observing the announced estimate µ A . According to Bayes' rule, i.e.
g(X|µ
and exploiting the normality of µ A and X, the posterior beliefs are normally distributed with mean
and precision
Hence the adjustment of market participants' mean beliefs induced by the public announcement, µ P − µ F , is obtained by
Thus the shift in traders' average beliefs is proportional to the deviation of the announcement µ A from its corresponding mean forecast µ F . This is typically referred to as unanticipated information in an announcement or as surprise S, i.e.,
Moreover, the strength of this belief revision is also determined by the precision of the announcement, ρ A , relative to the precision of posterior beliefs,
Assume that the market price P of some risky asset is proportional to traders' conditional expectations of X, i.e., P = ν · µ F before the announcement, ν · µ p after the announcement with ν denoting some constant. 14 Then the change in market prices ∆P induced by a public announcement is given by
where π denotes the so-called 'price-response coefficient'
that determines the strength of the price reaction dependent on the relative precision of the announced data compared to the precision of posterior beliefs.
From the above analysis the following empirically testable implications arise:
(i) Eq. (2) suggests that the immediate price change after an announcement is proportional to the amount of unanticipated information in an announcement. This implication is standard and has been tested in several previous studies, e.g. by Hardouvelis (1988) , Dwyer and Hafer (1989) , Fleming and Remolona (1999c) and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , to name only a few.
(ii) From eq. (2) in connection with the price-response coefficient (eq. 3), it follows that the immediate price impact of a given surprise depends on the relative precision of the announcement compared to prior information. The price reaction is stronger (weaker)
if the announced information is perceived to be more (less) precise relative to the precision of information available before the announcement. The two limiting cases emerge when ρ F → 0 or when ρ A → 0. In the first case, we observe a maximal price reaction due to the fact that prior information is completely imprecise. In the second case, the price response is zero because the announcement itself provides no new information.
Even though the model framework above discussed is rather simple, it nicely illustrates the basic mechanism of Bayesian learning, i.e. that the magnitude of the price response is determined by the amount of unanticipated information and, simultaneously, by the relative precision of information. These fundamental relationships are also found in extended frameworks like, for example, in Kandel and Pearson (1995) and Kim and Verrecchia (1991) who model the frequently observed positive relation between volatility and trading volume, or in Veronesi (1999) who explains asymmetries in the price reaction to 'good' versus 'bad' news.
III. Measuring the precision of information
A. Major information components in the U.S. employment report
The profound price impact of unanticipated information in the U.S. employment report on various financial markets is well documented. 15 While this report, which is released by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), provides a large amount of detailed information, both market participants and researchers focus their attention on a few so-called headline figures,
15 Several studies provide strong evidence that unanticipated information in the employment report influences interest rates (e.g. Becker, Finnerty, and Kopecky (1996) , Fleming and Remolona (1999c) , and Hautsch and
Hess (2002)), foreign exchange rates (e.g. Hardouvelis (1988) , Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) ), as well as stock prices (e.g. Boyd, Hu, and Jagannathan (2005) ). In addition, various studies document that the U.S. employment report influences the volatility of bond prices and foreign exchange rates (e.g. Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) , DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) , Jones, Lamont, and Lumsdaine (1998), and Bollerslev, Cai, and Song (2000) ), bid-ask spreads (e.g. Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) ) as well as trading volumes (e.g. Fleming and Remolona (1999a) ).
in particular the nonfarm payrolls figure and the unemployment rate figure. 16 Both figures are disseminated via several news vendors within seconds and provide market participants with a timely and comprehensive estimate of current economic activity. Moreover, they allow some inference about inflationary pressures which might arise from a tightening labor market.
In addition, analysts' forecasts are available for these figures which make it possible to differentiate between the anticipated part of a given piece of information and the unanticipated part.
[insert Table 1 around here] A particularly interesting feature of the employment report is the fact that the initially released nonfarm payrolls figure is revised in subsequent months. 20 The May 1999 report reveals that the preliminary April estimate was revised by 245 (i.e. from the previously disclosed level of 127,911 to 128,156). Primarily, revisions are the result of late responses and followup inquiries with non-respondents. 21 In addition, revisions reflect a re-estimation of seasonal adjustment factors and alignments of the employment establishment survey based estimates with the so-called "full universe counts" derived from unemployment insurance records. Note that revisions indicate problems in the sampling process, i.e. sampling errors in the previous month's data. Hence they are natural indicators for the precision of the previously released information. Therefore it seems reasonable to assume that market participants exploit this information in order to assess the precision of the released data. This argument is set forth in the following section which shows how such a precision proxy can be constructed.
B. Release-specific precision estimates
Since the price impact of an announcement is determined by the relative precision of the announcement compared to pre-announcement expectations, we need two precision estimates in order to approximate the price impact coefficient π given in eq. (3): an estimate of the precision of prior information, ρ F , and of the released data, ρ A .
Following Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995) , Mohammed and Yadav (2002) , (i.e. H0: α = 0, β = 1) can be rejected. Most importantly, however, none of the studies finds such deficiencies in nonfarm payrolls forecasts.
and Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) , among others, we interpret the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts before an announcement as a measure of the dispersion of prior expectations. To be precise,ŝ F,m denotes the cross-sectional standard deviation of forecasts for a particular month m. Then ρ F,m is estimated byρ F,m = 1/ŝ 2 F,m .
In order to approximate ρ A,m , we need release-specific precision estimates of the announced headline figures. Unfortunately, the employment report -like other macroeconomic releases -does not provide a survey-specific sample error estimate which would help traders to assess the quality of released the data at the time of the announcement. Nevertheless, we suppose that traders try to obtain a substitute for such a precision estimate. To capture these effects, we specify a model which not only allows for seasonality effects in the (conditional) variance of revisions, but also accounts for short-term and longterm dynamics in both of the first two moments. Therefore we model the revisions in terms of an ARMA-GARCH model, where we include a seasonality term in the conditional variance function. Hence the estimated model is obtained bẏ
whereṘ N F,m denotes the revision of the nonfarm payroll figure in month m, measured in percentage points of the previously announced level of total nonfarm payrolls, g m is the conditional variance of ε m and s m denotes a seasonality function which is specified on the basis of a Fourier series approximation as introduced by Gallant (1981) and applied by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) . Assuming a polynomial of degree Q, the non-stochastic seasonal trend term is specified as
where δ s , δ s c,j , and δ s s,j are the seasonal coefficients to be estimated and m ∈ [0, 1] is a normalized time trend, i.e. the number of months from the beginning of a year divided by 12.
To avoid a possible look-ahead bias, model selection, estimation and forecasting is performed on the basis of a rolling sample window: firstly, for a particular month m different ARMA-GARCH models are estimated using the last 10 years of revision data available at that time (i.e. revisions announced in month m − 119, m − 118, ..., m). In order to restrict the computational burden, we select among ARMA-GARCH models of a lag order of one, with and without a seasonality component in the conditional variance equation as given by (6).
Secondly, among these models the one with the best in-sample fit according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) is selected. Thirdly, using the selected model a one-step-ahead forecast of the conditional revision variance,ĝ m+1|m , is computed. This forecast is used as a proxy for the precision of the current announcement, i.e.ρ A,m = 1/ĝ m+1|m .
[insert Table 2 around here] Table 2 summarizes the goodness-of-fit of the different ARMA-GARCH specifications in the individual rolling sample windows. In nearly all cases the estimated AR and MA parameters 24 in the conditional mean function are insignificant which confirms the findings above that (signed) revisions are not autocorrelated. However, in most cases we find evidence for significant ARCH and GARCH parameters. On average, we obtain (significant) estimates of the GARCH parameters ofψ 1,1 ≈ −0.03 andψ 2,1 ≈ 0.48. The positive GARCH parameter indicates that there is a predictable long-run component in the variance of revisions. A possible reason for this finding could be that the reliability of labor market figures is influenced by 24 For brevity, we refrain from reporting the individual parameter estimates.
the (long-run) state of the labor market, and thus by underlying business cycle effects. The negative ARCH parameter 25 indicates short-term reversal effects. We attribute this finding to the effect that the yearly systematic fluctuations in squared revisions do not necessarily always take place in the same month but can be shifted by plus/minus one or two months.
These patterns cannot be captured by a static seasonality function and require to account for short-term reversals. The finding that in all cases a GARCH(1,1) specification which is augmented by a seasonality component provides the best goodness-of-fit confirms the usefulness of the proposed specification. 26 Finally, the two proxy variables for the precision of pre-announcement information (ρ F,m ) and the precision of the announcement (ρ A,m ) enable us to estimate the price-response coefficient π m in eq. (2) for nonfarm payrolls. In Section IV we will useπ m in order to test for the relevance of information precision.
IV. Empirical Results

A. Data
To analyze the price impact of (more precise) information, we use log returns of CBOT T-bond futures in 2-minute intervals during a 90-minute window around the 8:30 a.m. employment releases, more precisely from 8:22 to 9:52 a.m. EST. 27 This window is suggested on the one hand by the floor trading hours of the CBOT, which starts at 8:20 a.m. and on the 25 Since we do not impose any parameter restrictions, the conditional variance is not restricted to be nonnegative. Nevertheless, in our analysis, all specifications produced strictly positive variance forecasts. 26 In particular, the GARCH(1,1) model performs best in 88 out of 144 estimations, followed by the AR(1)-GARCH(1,1) model in 38 cases. 
B. Estimation approach
To investigate the effects of variations in the quality of information, we model the log T-bond futures returns using an ARMA specification which is augmented by appropriate explanatory variables. In order to account for (conditional) heteroscedasticity, we include ARCH terms and seasonality variables in the conditional variance function. Hence we assume the following process for 2-minute log returns:
28 In the analyzed period, once the GDP report, six times Personal Income and eight times Leading Indicators are announced at the same time. Although most of these reports are of minor importance (see e.g. Fleming and Remolona (1999c) ) all of these days are eliminated to avoid interference. Moreover, we eliminated one day with an inadvertently early release (see e.g. Fleming and Remolona (1999b) ). Note, however, that retaining these 16 observations does not change our results substantially.
29 Precisely, nonfarm payrolls surprises are defined as the deviation of the announced number of new nonfarm payrolls from the median of analysts' forecasts divided by the number of total nonfarm payrolls in the previous month (times 100). The unemployment rate figure is already given in percentage points (i.e. the change of the overall unemployment rate from month to month).
where t indexes the 2-minute intervals around the release of the employment report for month m. Furthermore, x t denotes a vector of explanatory variables in the conditional mean function including surprise and revision variables (for more details, see Section C) while β is the corresponding coefficient vector. The seasonality function s t in the conditional variance function accounts for heteroscedasticity due to (deterministic) baseline patterns of the volatility around announcements (see e.g. Hautsch and Hess (2002) ) and is specified in terms of a flexible Fourier form (see eq. 6) based on the 90-minute time interval from 8:22 to 9:52 a.m. EST.
In contrast to Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) 
C. Information precision and the strength of the price response
To investigate whether the precision of information determines the strength of the price impact of unanticipated information, we test whether the influence of 'precise' information is significantly different from that of 'imprecise' information. Estimation results for different specifications of (7) and (8) are given in Table 3 .
[insert Table 3 around here]
The lag order of the individual autoregressive components is chosen according to the AIC and reveals an AR(2)-ARCH(3) specification with a seasonality component as the pre- 31 See, for example, Becker, Finnerty, and Kopecky (1996) , Balduzzi, Elton, and Green (2001) , Fleming and Remolona (1999a,c) , or Hautsch and Hess (2002) for bond markets and Almeida, Goodhart, and Payne (1998) or Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) for foreign exchange markets.
the coefficients of S N F,t and S U N,t 33 shows that the nonfarm payrolls figure has the strongest price impact. Extending previous studies, we also include revisions of the previously released nonfarm payroll figure in the analysis, i.e. R N F,t−1 , R N F,t and R N F,t+1 . However, none of these coefficients are statistically significant. This creates the impression that market participants ignore revisions.
Focussing on precision effects, model (A) already yields some preliminary evidence.
Although it does not account for the differences of the relative precision of unanticipated information over time, it allows us to compare the price impact of headline figures with different average precisions. According to the BLS, the average sampling error of the nonfarm payrolls figure is smaller (0.09%) than the sampling error of the unemployment rate figure (0.13%). 34 Hence we would expect the more precise nonfarm payrolls figure to have a stronger price impact on average. In fact, the estimated coefficient of S N F,t is significantly higher than the coefficient of S U N,t which is confirmed by a one-sided likelihood ratio (LR). 35 This result may be interpreted as a first piece of evidence in favor of the claim of Bayesian learning that more precise information should have a stronger price impact.
In order to investigate release-specific precision effects, we extend model (A) by including interaction variables which account for differences in information precision across individual nonfarm payroll announcements (model (B) in Table 3 ). According to eq. (2) price-response coefficientπ m at month m is higher than the sample median ofπ m , and 0 otherwise. Correspondingly, D π low equals 1 ifπ m is lower or equal than the sample median,
The large difference between the estimates β 2 h and β 2 strongly supports the notion that the relative precision determines the strength of the price impact. The coefficient β 2 h associated with D π high is almost 50% larger than β 2 associated with D π low . This suggests that 'precise' announcements move prices much more than 'imprecise' information. In fact, on the basis of a one-sided LR test, the null hypothesis that imprecise nonfarm payrolls surprises have a stronger price impact can be rejected at the 1% level. 37 Furthermore, as indicated by the AIC, the inclusion of precision dummies leads to an improvement of the model's goodness-of-fit.
D. Quality of information vs. sign effects?
An alternative candidate to explain asymmetric price reactions is the so-called sign effect, i.e. a stronger price response to 'bad' than to 'good' news. Several theoretical models justify such asymmetries in the price response, however, mainly only for stock markets and not for bond markets. 38 Nevertheless, it might be argued that without a more detailed analysis we cannot preclude that our finding of an asymmetric price response to more precise news stems 36 Note that Abarbanell, Lanen, and Verrecchia (1995) argue that the dispersion of analysts' forecasts may not fully capture investors' uncertainty before an announcement. Therefore our proxy of prior information precision could be systematically too high and our price-response coefficient too low. However, since we are not primarily interested in the values ofπ itself, but instead use this proxy variable to group our observations into two categories ('precise' vs. 'imprecise' announcements), this bias should have no systematic impact on our results.
from a spurious correlation between the precision and the sign of information. In order to account for both sign and precision effects, we extend the previous analysis and test whether prices react stronger to more precise 'bad' ('good') news than to less precise 'bad' ('good') news.
To perform this test, we interact the variable S N F,t with dummy variables which indicate whether a surprise in this headline figure provides 'good' news for the bond market, Landsman (2002) for the stock market, the estimated coefficients indicate that 'bad' news has a stronger (negative) price impact than 'good' news. In fact, the null hypothesis that
g is rejected on the 1% significance level. Moreover, the difference in the impact of 'good' and 'bad' news is almost as large as the difference in the impact of precise and imprecise news (model (B)). Hence from the comparison of models (B) and (C) we cannot conclude whether asymmetries in the price response are solely due to a 'good' versus 'bad' news effect or a 'precise' versus 'imprecise' news effect or whether both effects are present. Therefore we interact the 'bad' and 'good' news variables with the precision dummies (model (D) ). This analysis clearly shows that both effects are apparent at the same time. On the one hand, the price impact of precise 'bad' news is stronger than the impact of precise 'good' news, i.e.
β 2 h,b < β 2 h,g (the same holds true for imprecise 'bad' and 'good' news, i.e. β 2 ,b < β 2 ,g ).
This is confirmed by a one-sided LR test on the joint hypothesis that the price impact of 'bad' news (either precise or imprecise) is not larger than the price impact of 'good' news,
. This hypothesis is rejected on the 1% level. On the other hand, similar differences can be found between precise and imprecise news. The price impact of precise 'bad' ('good') news is stronger than the impact of imprecise 'bad' ('good') news,
). In fact, the hypothesis that the more precise news does not have a stronger price impact while controlling for 'bad' and 'good' news (i.e.
) is rejected on the 1% level as well.
Overall, these results provide strong evidence in favor of the claim of Bayesian learning that the quality of information plays an important role in determining its price impact. Prices respond stronger to more precise news. Furthermore, we find evidence for a sign effect in the bond market which does not explain the precision effect. Thus asymmetries in the price response to unanticipated information are driven by differences in the (relative) precision
and by the sign of this information.
V. Conclusion
The theory of belief formation in financial markets suggests that the quality of information determines the strength of the price reaction to a given piece of unanticipated information. Empirical research, in particular (event) studies of earnings response coefficients and earnings management, has focussed thus far exclusively on proxies of the quality of announced information, mainly by studying indicators of the reliability of disclosed corporate financial information. However, Bayesian learning claims that the strength of price reactions is driven by the relative precision of information available before and after an announcement.
Unfortunately, due to the unavailability of release-specific data on the precision of information, little evidence in favor of the link between the strength of the price reaction and the relative quality of information is available. The main objective of this paper is to fill this gap left in the empirical literature. Focussing on the U.S. employment report, we are able to extract a relative precision measure. By utilizing additional detailed information released with the headline figures of the employment report, i.e. revisions of previously announced figures,
we obtain a measure of the quality of the released data; the precision of prior information is approximated by the cross-sectional standard deviations of analysts' forecasts. These two precision proxies allow us to construct a measure of the release-specific relative quality of the nonfarm payrolls headline figure, which is the most influential information component in the employment report. Since this precision measure is based exclusively on information which is available at the time of an announcement, we assume that it provides a reasonable approximation of the quality of released information on which market participants can base their trading decisions.
On the basis of proposed precision proxies, we find significant evidence in favor of the claim of Bayesian learning that the quality of information acts as a catalyst, i.e. prices respond stronger to more precise news. Our results suggest that traders try to compensate for the lack of official release-specific sample error estimates by extracting release-specific precision signals from additional information related to the widely awaited headline figures. Analyzing the robustness of this result, the stronger price impact of more precise news remains unchanged, even if we control for the asymmetric price reaction due to 'good' vs. 'bad' news. In other words, precise 'bad' ('good') news leads to stronger downward (upward) price movements than imprecise 'bad' ('good') news. Hence the asymmetries in price responses to news are driven by both the precision and the sign of information. The table reports the R-squared, the log likelihood (LL), the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and χ 2 statistics of LR tests on the inequality of individual parameters (log likelihood of restricted models in parentheses).
Statistical inference is based on QML standard errors (Bollerslev and Wooldridge 1992) . * * * , * * , and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Except for the LR tests, the level of significance is based on two-sided tests.
